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A review of Morals, Reason, and 
philosophy is (in)famous, the combined force of theirAnimals by Steven F. Sapontzis 
work has been to put apologists for theory's traditional (Philadelphia: Temple University pretensions somewhat on the defensive. The critics' 
Press, 1987)	 positive views about the form of moral philosophy 
sans moral theory, have, however, been even more 
varied (and rather vaguer) than their critiques. From 
the lack of an articulate positive program, along with 
suspicions that antitheory in ethics might have strongly 
conservative implications, the theorists have taken heart. 
Sapontzis' contribution to this debate-although he 
modestly does not identify it as such-is quite 
important. He provides an object lesson in how to do 
In a series of articles dating back to the late moral philosophy without a commitment to a single 
1970's, Steven F. Sapontzis has developed a position unified theory which demonstrates in the abstract what 
on our moral relationship to nonhuman animals which "makes right acts right." In so doing, he shows that it 
is at least as searching and as original as the better­ doesn't take such a theory to provide an intellectually 
known work of Singer and Regan. Morals. Reason, respectable critique of a major social institution. 
and Animals assembles and refines the themes 
introduced in his earlier essays. The result is an 
*** 
interesting contribution to a discussion in contemporary 
moral theory, as well as an examination of our dealings Sapontzis' own "anti-theoretical" tendencies 
with nonhumans that shows just how thoroughly dovetail with what is perhaps the leading idea of his 
dubious they are. book, namely, that we have made altogether too much 
A major ongoing debate in moral philosophy of reason as a qualification for moral status. The kind 
concerns what, to use a characteristically Sapontzian of reason of which philosophers tend to be fond, as 
way of putting things, might be called the Sapontzis sees it, not only can't build theories that will 
(in)Significance of Moral Theory. Influential writers conclusively resolve moral quandaries, but is also beside 
such as Bernard Williams, Annette Baier, Martha the point as a requirement for being morally significant. 
Nussbaum, and Alasdair MacIntyre, among many others, 
have all raised considerable doubts about the 
philosophical enterprise of"grounding" ethics in moral 
theory, especially if that is taken to mean one which 
claims to be able to derive our moral duties from a small 
number of basic principles. l Although the critics' REVIEW 
reasons for inveighing against the "standard" conception 
of ethical theory exhibit the variety for which 
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Nonhwnans cannot engage in moral theory. nor. often. 
in the kinds ofactivities which moral theorists claim to 
be crucial for moral standing (which are many times 
almost identical with those needed to build a theory). 
But careful attention to what Sapontzis calls "everyday 
morality" shows that envisaging kingdoms of ends. or 
universalizing the maxims of our actions. or being 
strictly impartial. are not needed in order to behave well. 
nor to merit the respectful concern of others. 
Accordingly. when Sapontzis sees a conflict between 
philosophical accounts of ethics. and common moral 
thinking and behavior. the philosophical accounts are 
shown the door. For example. if Kant holds that the 
only actions which have true moral value are those 
which proceed out of a respect for the moral law. 
Sapontzis will note that we more greatly prize the 
parent who acts in behalf of her children out of love 
than the parent who acts out of duty alone; if Singer 
claims that taking a moral point of view demands that 
we be prepared to defend our judgements and behavior 
with impartial reasons. Sapontzis counters with 
examples of people who may lack what William 
Ruddick has called "discursive moral competence," but 
who we would all admit are capable ofacting morally.2 
Sapontzis unfolds this general theme in two ways. 
He argues that attempts to rule animals out of the sphere 
of moral considerability are speciously philosophical in 
that they. for example. pitch the standard of rationality 
supposedly required for moral standing so high as to 
leave many humans out in the cold. The other tactic is 
to show that the moral aims that commonly run through 
our community would all be better served by a policy 
of liberating animals than they would by continuing 
the status quo. 
The first strategy occupies the beginning of the book. 
where he concentrates on showing the limits ofreason's 
importance for moral status. A particularly significant 
claim here is that nonhuman animals can act in ways 
that have a moral value that reflects on the actor. 
Sapontzis calls this "agent dependent" moral value. or 
moralad value. This is a bold idea. It pulls nonhumans 
into the moral community not simply as "moral 
patients." but as moral agents as well. and in so doing, 
questions common ideas about the gulf separating 
humans and nonhumans that are WlChallenged even by 
prominent proponents of animals. Many nonhumans. 
Sapontzis says. meet all the reasonable criteria for acting 
in moralad ways: they act freely and straightforwardly 
in response to the goods and evils a situation presents 
to them. He does admit that nonhumans lack the 
interest and ability to strive to make the world a better 
place; hence. they are not fully moral agents. But, like 
"kindhearted. spontaneously generous [and] compas­
sionate people" (p. 45). they are virtuous agents, and 
hence their acts possess moralad value. 
This may strike even friends of animals as a bit 
extreme; they may recall Aristotle's distinction between 
"natural virtue." which is the portion of children and 
animals. and "virtue in the full sense of the word." 
which requires (normal human) intelligence (cf. 
Nichomacheaa Ethics VI.13). For example. John 
McDowell. who accepts this distinction. has recently 
contrasted the virtue of a genuinely kind person with 
"the outcome of a blind. non-rational habit or instinct. 
like the courageous behavior- so called only by 
courtesy-of a lioness defending her cubs...3 But 
Sapontzis is skillful atdisanning such doubts. He points 
out that there is a vast difference between highly 
routinized. blindly instinctual behavior. such as the 
spawning instinctofsalmon. and the much more flexible, 
context-sensitive actions of such social animals as 
wolves. who exhibit faithful and affectionate behavior 
as spouses and parents, and are. in words borrowed from 
Mary Midgley. "paragons of steadiness and good 
conduct" (p. 27). 
Narrowing the perceived moral gap between 
nonhumans and humans is a significant result, especially 
when coupled with Sapontzis' critique of the concept 
of 'personhood.' Philosophers often take the conditions 
for inclusion in the set of persons to be identical with 
those necessary and sufficient for having a right to life. 
Some claim that the concept of a person includes many 
but not all human beings (fetuses. infants. and the 
permanently and profoundly retarded are the usual 
exceptions) and some nonhumans (primates. cetaceans 
and perhaps others as well). Personhood may thus 
appear to be an ethically progressive concept, as it is 
nonspeciesist, and significantly expands the sphere of 
rights holders. But, as Sapontzis sees it, despite its 
advances over previously popular moral notions. 
personhood still retains "the logic of prejudice." The 
upshot of his discussion is that basing moral status on 
what he calls "metaphysical" characteristics of a thing 
(i.e.• what basic ontological category it occupies. of 
which personhood may be an example) is as morally 
arbitrary as basing moral status on considerations such 
as race or gender. The only defensible grounds for 
assigning or withholding moral status is the character 
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of the being in question ("or other evaluative 
considerations, such as minimizing suffering, relevant 
to making the world a morally better place." (p. 64», 
and this is where the significance ofanimal virtue comes 
in. Animals merit our moral respect, not because they 
may be persons, and not (solely) because they are 
sentient, or subjects of a life, but because they are 
generally decent, sometimes admirable, occasionally 
heroic beings. 
The book's second part clarifies and motivates the 
animal liberation movement The most effective way 
of examining a moral position, as Sapontzis sees it, is 
to note its relationship to the three chief themes that 
run through everyday morality-briefly, these are 
promoting virtue, making the world a happier place, 
and fairness. This technique threatens to break down 
if some themes supported a proposed practice, while 
others run counter to it Happily-although perhaps 
surprisingly, given our actions-all three elements of 
common morality speak for, rather than against, the 
liberation of animals. 
One such element is concern for moral character, 
for the development of "compassion, altruism, respect 
for the interests and rights ofothers, a sense of fairness, 
a willingness to stand up and take risks for those who 
cannotdefend themselves, and so forth" (p. 90). Animal 
liberation contributes to this goal primarily by 
extending the sphere of moral considerability. There 
is simply much more that a conscientious moral agent 
now has to keep in mind. The lines that divide the 
world into the issues that require moral reflection and 
virtue (e.g., our duties to the homeless, abortion) and 
those that are morally discretionary (what to eat for 
lunch, what experiments to perform in pursuit of one's 
Ph.D.) will no longer be arbitrarily drawn. At the same 
time, the extra challenges imparted by liberating animals 
are realistic, not utopian, requiring moral seriousness, 
but not sainthood. Liberating animals, although 
making morality a more complex and more pervasive 
part of our lives, would not overburden us; that is 
not what morality is for. It would make of us a more 
compassionate, more morally imaginative and 
creative community, which fits in squarely with our 
own best ideals. 
But this line can at best lend ancillary support to a 
position established on other grounds. One important 
moral virtue is discernment, which involves recognizing 
which issues appropriately make moral demands on us 
and which do not; the corresponding vice is 
overscrupulousness. Whether it is a good thing to make 
the part of our lives that involves nonhumans more or 
less morally complex is not a matter that can be 
reasonably influenced by DOling that, were we to think 
of them as more morally signifICant, we'd have to make 
more and more difficult ethical decisions; the same 
could be said in support of a proposal to extend moral 
recognition to used cars. The crux of the matter is 
whether doing so involves proper discernment or 
overscrupulousness. What Sapontzis may be illustraling 
here is that the various threads of common morality 
interpenetrate and reinforce one another, and that each 
borrows from the other in showing where practical 
reason shoukllead us. 
A line more diRctly supported by our concern for 
moral character returns to the argument that animals 
can be virtuous agents, and suggests that there is a 
certain incoherency in professing great moral respect 
for virtue, but none for those who are virtuous. What is 
the sense in admiring the deed and kicking the doer? 
This argument appears here and there in Sapontzis' 
book, but oddly enough it is not worked out in much 
detail in the section that explores how respect for virtue 
motivates animal liberation. 
Another part of the common morality is the goal of 
making the world a happier place. Although the point 
has been disputed, it seems very likely that a policy of 
reducing and ultimately ending the vast suffering that 
nonhumans undergo at our hands would substantially 
enhance the balance of satisfied to frustrated interests 
in the world, and thus contribute to this goal. It is true 
that such a shift would cause pelSonaI and systematic 
dislocations for humans, but these, as Sapontzis points 
out, would be eased by the development ofalternatives 
to animal-consuming industries, and by the fact that 
the shifts would occur over an extended period of time 
(although, presumably, this time lag in implementing 
radical reforms is something to be regretted, not 
welcomed, by serious animal advocates). But the 
fundamental point is that the stresses occasioned by the 
change would fade with time, but the benefits enjoyed 
by animals would continue indefinitely into the future. 
This consideration, of course, presupposes a certain 
scope to everyday morality's concern with a better 
world, namely, that it extends into the indefinite future. 
It is worth noting that not even every version of 
utilitarianism does that As Sapontzis himself thinks 
that our concern with the future ought not to extmd 
more than seventy-five or a hundred years hence---a 
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point to be examined later-there seems an internal 
tension here, too. 
Yet another tension might arise from another 
difference between everyday morality's interest in 
making the world a better, happier place, and that of 
utilitarianism, the philosophical theory built on this 
theme. The theory bids us to be stricdy impartial in 
our assessment of interest satisfaction and frustmtion, 
but ordinary morality has no such requirement, and, in 
fact, directs us to give special regard to our kin and 
friends. Yet the magnitude ofanimal suffering, and the 
relative triviality of the human interests which can only 
be served by that suffering, must trump even a moral 
perspective which gives special regard to the interests 
ofour nearest and dearest, unless that view is simply a 
rationalization for personal chauvinism of the most 
extreme kind, and not a concern that the world be a 
better place at all. The only plausible exception to this 
is the case of the best animal-based medical research. 
Research that is of high quality from both scientific 
and humane standpoints, which targets debilitating and 
widespread diseases. and from which there is good hope 
of progress. may perhaps be justified both from a 
utilitarian standpoint and from the standpoint of this 
aspect of common morality. It is true that morality's 
other features-the development of virtue and 
fairness-might spealc against rersearch. In that case, 
however, we would be in a situation of internal moral 
conflict, and Sapontzis' work, resting on the conver­
gence of all elements of ordinary morality on a broad 
animal liberation platform, does not contain strategies 
for resolving such conflict. 
The final aspect of common morality is fairness. 
Certainly in research, as in other aspects of our 
interactions with them, animals typically bear all the 
burdens while humans reap the benefits. Intuitively, 
this seems unfair, a charge that could only be turned 
away by considering reasons why animals simply don't 
count from the perspective of fairness, or why, despite 
appearances, they aren't really being treated unfairly. 
Sapontzis handles the flTSt of these responses perhaps 
too briefly, simply noting that to say that an animal is 
being treated unfairly is not to make a category mistake. 
But even if the claim isn't patent nonsense, it might 
still be disguised nonsense. Some philosophers, for 
example, have thought that considerations of justice 
arise only among creatures that are TOughly equivalent 
in their vulnerabilities to one another, a condition that 
does not hold between humans and nonhumans.4 Yet it 
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does seem intuitively correct to say that humans who 
don't satisfy the so-called "circumstances ofjustice"­
say, the weak and infinn-can still be treated unfairly, 
and if they can, why not animals of roughly equivalent 
powers and vulnerabilities? This strategy smacks of 
the "argument from marginal cases," an appeal which 
Sapontzis fmds weaker than many animal advocates, 
as he seems to admit that our care for "marginal" 
members ofourown species may be urged by sentiment, 
rather than dictated by principle (see pp. 141ft). If so, 
then our tenderness to the weak of our own species­
even if that tenderness is expressed by a sense that it is 
not fair for the strong to exploit the weak-may not be 
good grounds for claiming that nonhumans are 
appropriate subjects of justice. The more effective 
strategy is probably to point out, as Sapontzis does, that 
it seems part of the point of morality-in particular of 
the part that concerns fairness-to defend the weak 
against exploitation by the strong, and that any account 
of justice that overlooks that is incomplete. 
If there is no categorical reason for denying that 
animals can be treated unjustly, then defenses of the 
fairness of their treatment are generally quite lame, 
although Sapontzis has the patience to show just why 
they limp. There is, however, a set of considerations, 
the "replacement argument," which may be of some 
serious interest It contends that it is permissable to 
use and kill an animal if its existence depends upon its 
being used and killed by us, and if after death, it will be 
replaced by another animal, which would not have 
existed were the flTSt animal to remain alive, and ifboth 
animals have lives TOughly equally worth living. 
Sapontzis spends an entire chapter unpacking this 
argument. He fIrst notes that it is a response to an 
idealized case. The animals stocked in our factory farms 
and our laboratories are of such moral interest precisely 
because they fail to have lives worth living. Still, one 
can imagine refonnsofanimal research, ifnot intensive 
farming, which might greatly enhance the lives of its 
purpose-bred subjects. Suppose, for example, that 
animals bred for research were housed in settings that 
allowed them to enjoy a good deal of what life might 
hold for them, were used only in crucial research, and 
were painlessly euthanized. If the replacement 
argument were sound, it would seem to justify this 
possibility as a goal for the refonn of animal research. 
Whether anyone's life is replaceable depends on 
what makes a life valuable. Sapontzis displays a number 
of competing accounts, which fall into utilitarian and 
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nonutilitarian families. The nonutilitarian accounts are 
divided in their turn: one version sees our lives as the 
very source of moral value, due to our capacity for 
autonomous action; the other rests our significance on 
the more basic capacity simply to confer any kind of 
value on things. 
On Sapontzis' view, neither of these accounts will 
support the replacement argument. On the frrst, the 
decent exercise of their moral agency earns animals the 
right to live out their lives. On the second, agents 
typically value their own pursuit of their own projects; 
replacement by someone else-even if she has equally 
worthy projects-does not preserve that. This, of 
course, would seem to assume that animals not only 
have an interest in livingso as tocomplete their projects, 
but that they take an interest in living as well That non­
humans typically can do so is doubtful. Nor is it clear 
that valuing our own projects protects us from 
replocement; surely, ourreplacementswill value theirown 
projects as well, so it isn't clear what's irretrievably lost 
Utilitarianism would, at any rate, seem to be the more 
natural setting for the replacement argument, as it is 
less hospitable to the idea that individuals-as opposed 
to the experiences they "contain"-have intrinsic moral 
worth. But Sapontzis argues that a general utilitarian 
outlookwill yield several relevant accounts of the value 
of life, that only one of them clearly supports the 
replacement argument, and that the considerations often 
urged in behalf of that particular view are much less 
persuasive than they at first appear. 
Utilitarianism consists of both a theory of the good 
(classically, hedonism; more currently, the view that 
the satisfaction of interests is intrinsically good) and a 
range principle, which detennines for whom the good 
or bad consequences of a given action or policy are to 
be considered. The crucial distinction for Sapontzis' 
discussion is between "total population" and "prior 
existence" versions of the range principle. "Total 
population" utilitarianism bids us to maximize the 
overall good taking into account both currently existing 
sentient beings, as well as those who may come to exist; 
it is distinguished from the "prior existence" version 
which restricts itself to sentient beings once they have 
begun to exist as such. Clearly, the "prior existence" 
versions will protect animals against the prospect of 
replacement, but total population versions of 
utilitarianism (depending on which theory of the good 
they employ) leave us more or less vulnerable to the 
prospect of replacement 
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A significant weakness of prior existence 
utilitarianism seems its conflict with the idea that future 
generations have a moral claim on us. Sapontzis' 
discussion of this problem is not convincing. He points 
out that, even on the prior existence view, we have 
duties to the future which extend between seventy­
five and one hundred years hence, since there are now 
people living who will still be alive then, and, as 
previously mentioned, he thinks that's long enough. But 
this seems very dubious in the light of such moral 
questions as arise from the production and storage of 
nuclear waste, which presents dangers which extend 
thousands of years into the future, and whose 
management seems much more problematic as we 
wonder about the reliability of storage technology not 
a century, but rather a millenium ahead. 
The discussion of the replacement argument 
occupies a central position in the book's third part, 
which also features insightful discussions of whether 
animals have interests (targeting primarily R. G. Frey, 
who has maintained that only language-users have 
interests) and whether death is a hann to nonhumans. 
In both instances, Sapontzis maintains that it is not to 
the point whether a creature can cognitively entertain a 
certain proposition-for example, that death is an ill. 
It is sufficient that the creatures have feelings of weIl­
and ill-being. Artifacts and plants fail to have morally 
considerable interests precisely because they lack this 
capacity to feel. Since death precludes the further 
satisfaction of those interests, it is (prima facie, at least) 
a hann to any interest bearer. 
In the fmal part of the book, Sapontzis works out 
some practical implications of the kind of animal 
liberation he supports. Once again, his views are 
characterized by their originality, clarity, and cogency. 
His topics include the obligation to be vegetarian, the 
legitimacy (or otherwise) of animal research, how we 
should respond to the fact that animals prey on other 
animals, and the relationship of his position to 
environmental ethics. All of these discussions repay 
attention, but the focus here will be on his remarks 
concerning animal research. 
Sapontzis argues that nonhumans should not be 
exposed to greater research risks than humans. This 
would not rule out animal research altogether: as he 
sees it, animals can give a meaningful kind of consent 
to participation in some research (typically, research 
that is noninvasive, and which offers them some reward 
for participation) and others can appropriately consent 
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for them, so long as the research is innocuous, or in the 
animal's own best interests. Actually, if equivalence 
to human levels of protection is the touchstone, then 
the net gets cast a bit wider than he suggests: well 
children are legally allowed to be subjects of 
experiments which place them at minimal risk and 
some discomfort, even if the experiments are not in 
their own interests; children who are in terminal 
conditions may become part of"PhaseOne" drug tests, 
which are of no therapeutic benefit and which may add 
substantially to their discomfortS 
Whatever the precise dimensions of allowable 
experimentation, it seemsclear that reforming scientific 
research to conform with them would involve very big 
changes. But animal research apologists might claim 
that even on Sapontzis' account, there is a moral 
difference between typical humans and nonhumans: we 
are fully moral agents, capable of striving to make the 
world a better place, while animals can act virtuously 
in ways largely limited to the confines of the world as 
it is presented to them. 
There are other, more or less reasonable attempts to 
make sense of the claim of human moral superiority: 
our capacity for both enjoyment and suffering might 
be greater than those of animals, for example. But, as 
Sapontzis shows, none of this clearly demonstrates 
human superiority. Unlike animals, we may have the 
capacity to strive to make the world better, but what's 
actually been our track record? This argument is 
weakened by the very suffering which it attempts to 
justify. As for ourallegedly greater degrees ofsuffering 
and enjoyment, these cut both ways: there is a wealth 
of sensations closed to humans but possessed by 
different animals in varying degrees, and an animal's 
restricted grasp of the past and future might make 
suffering harder to bear in someways, ifeasier in others. 
But even if there were ways in which humans could 
be shown to be morally superior to animals, we're still 
left with the issue of what behavior that superiority 
would license. An interesting feature of Sapontzis' 
investigation of this point is his emphasis on the 
egalitarian character of utilitarianism. He notes the 
antipathy to aristocracy which has traditionally been a 
part of utilitarian thought, and points out that the theory 
is structurally committed to regarding each individual 
equally in determining the harm/benefit consequences 
ofaparticular activity. Hence itwould not support even 
the idea of moral superiority. There is, however, some 
controversy over whether utilitarianism's egalitarianism 
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plays the role of a theory of distributive justice. D. D. 
Raphael, for one, claims that it does, but admits that 
this is a matter even utilitarians are confused about; 
Tom Regan,on the other hand, interprets the Bentharnite 
notion that "each should count for one and no one for 
more than one" as solely a predistributive kind of 
egalitarianism, in principle compatible with hierarchical 
distributions of utilities, so long as such distributions 
result in an utility sum that is optimal considered 
overall.6 No doubt, Bentham and others thought that 
utilitarianism would have antiheirarchical implications, 
but that was because they took hierarchies to have bad 
consequences considered generally and impartially, not 
because they had a special independent objection to 
the notion. 
IfRegan is right, standard forms ofutilitarianism as 
such do not undermine the moral hierarchy presupposed 
in even high quality animal research; rather, such 
research may be a practical instance of the conflict 
between justice and utility that utilitarianism is so often 
seen as giving rise to in theory. 
Since the ethical perspective of Morals. Reason, and 
Animals is pluralistic, resolving this disagreement about 
the implications of utilitarianism is not crucial. What 
is more significant is that Sapontzis' account of animal 
research succeeds in raising significant issues that have 
been underexplored in what has become a huge 
literature. It does, however, leave unexamined the 
neglected yet natural question of what is our duty 
with respect to the benefits we derive from animal 
research. In other words, how close is the analogy 
between ourduty to stop profiting from the exploitation 
ofanimals in factory farms by becoming vegetarians­
which Sapontzis spends a chapter supporting-and 
a duty to stop profiting from the exploitation of 
animals in medical research labs-which Sapontzis 
doesn't mention? 
Becoming a vegetarian has virtually no negative 
impact on key interests, as nutritious and tasty 
substitutes are available. Boycotting medicine is not 
so easy. As animal experimentation infects the whole 
of medicine, refusal to profit from it is tantamount to 
refusal to profit from the medical system as a whole. 
It is one thing to ask a meat-eater to give up her Big 
Mac. It is quite another to ask an AIDS sufferer to give 
up hisAZT. 
But if this difference in the character of affected 
interests allows one to accept the benefits of animal 
research, why does it not distinguish the moral 
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acceptability of the whole enterprise over thatof factory 
farming? In other words, many of us currently, and all 
ofus potentially, oweour lives to medical interventioos, 
and owe the availability of most of those interventions 
to animal research. Can we consistently reap the 
benefits of research, and yet demand that it be stopped 
cold (as opposed to greatly reformed) before reasonable 
alternatives are discovered? Might that not be asking 
us to ascribe to an ethic for saints and heroes, rather 
than for common folks adhering to everyday morality? 
The question deserves more attention than it gets. 
*** 
In the preface to Morals, Reason, and Animals, 
Sapontzis anticipates that people will come to his book 
wondering why, after the work of Singer, Regan, 
Rollin, Clark, Midgeley and others, anything more can 
usefully be said about the philosophical foundations 
of animal liberation. What Sapontzis achieves is not 
only to give us a new philosophical perspective on 
animals-most notably, his notion that they are virtuous 
agents, rather than merely subjects of moral concern­
but a new view of what it is to give a philosophical 
foundation to an ethical movement. He calls his book 
a"second generation" contribution to the philosophical 
debate on the ethics of interspecies relationships; if it 
sets the tone for discussion in this generation, the 
implications for both practice and theory are rich. 
Notes 
1 A useful collection of essays on this topic is 
StanleyG. Clarkeand Evan Simpson, eds. ,Anti-Theory 
in Ethics and Moral Conservatism (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1989). 
2 See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 9-10, referred 
to in Sapontzis, p. 22. 
3 John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason" in Clarke 
and Simpson, p. 88. Cootrast his account with the very 
effective example of nonhuman virtue given in James 
Rachels' "Do Animals Have a Right to Liberty?" in 
Tom Regan and Peter Singer, eds., Animal Rights and 
Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice­
Hall, 1976). Several primates were forced to observe 
that their food-gathering activities caused conspecifics 
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painful electric shocks. More than half the animals 
went hungry rather than subject their fellows to the pain; 
animals who had previously been shocked were 
especially willing to forego eating. 
4 See, for example, John Rawls' discussion of the 
"circumstances of justice" in A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 127ff. 
5 Department of Health and Human Services 
guidelines pertaining to experimentatioo on children are 
discussed in Baruch Brody and Tristram Englehardt, 
eds.,Bioethics: Readings and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-HaIl, 1987), pp. 266-267. 
6 For Raphael's discussion, see Chapter 5 of his 
Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1980). For Regan, see The Case for Animal Rights 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1983), chapters 6 and 7. 
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